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INTRODUCTION
Marriage is, and continues to be, a reactive institution. Although the
origins of marriage date back over 6000 years,1 the marital relationship is
continuously shaped by widely held social, economic, and legal views regarding
the rights available to those party to the union. As these views change over time,
the way partners interact with one another privately and publicly also changes.
While the modern institution of marriage looks quite diﬀerent in our
nation than it did ﬁfty years ago because of Supreme Court decisions
championing marriage equality,2 there is one speciﬁc group whose position
within the spousal relationship also begs focus: women. Women were long
subject to subservient positions in their marital relationships; even with the
passage of the Nineteenth Amendment,3 the newfound political equality
between men and women did not automatically lead to the dissolution of
female subordination. Overt social and legal subordination of women was the
norm until the latter half of the twentieth century when the 1960s women’s
rights movement began.4 The culprit for this treatment was common-law
American coverture, where a female’s legal status was absorbed into her
husband’s upon marriage, including her ability to sue or own property.5 As a
result, women were legally and ﬁnancially beholden to their spouses.
1 The ancient Mesopotamians used marriage to create progeny and maintain social
status. Joshua J. Mark, Love, Sex, and Marriage in Ancient Mesopotamia, W ORLD H ISTORY
E NCYC . (May 16, 2014), https://www.ancient.eu/article/688/love-sex-and-marriage-in-ancientmesopotamia [https://perma.cc/G4C8-ANKR].
2 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (holding prohibitions on interracial marriage
unconstitutional); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015) (holding prohibitions on samesex marriage unconstitutional).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. The Nineteenth Amendment reflected the success of the
decades-long women’s suffrage movement beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. See 19th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Women’s Right to Vote (1920), OURDOCUMENTS.GOV,
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=63 [https://perma.cc/GU4R-RMPL]
(“Beginning in the mid-19th century, several generations of woman suﬀrage supporters lectured,
wrote, marched, lobbied, and practiced civil disobedience to achieve what many Americans
considered a radical change of the Constitution.”).
4 See Linda Napikoski, The Women’s Movement and Feminine Activism in the 1960s, THOUGHTCO.,
https://www.thoughtco.com/1960s-feminist-activities-3529000 [https://perma.cc/WN6C-KUUL]
(describing the “series of changes to the status quo” achieved through the feminist movement of the
1960s). The Women’s Rights Movement solidified a movement towards social and political equity between
men and women in the United States. For more on the Women’s Rights Movement, see ELIZABETH C.
LARSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45805, WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE: FACT SHEET (2021).
5 See discussion infra subsection II.A.1.
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Coverture laws began to fade in the late nineteenth century, but some
states held on to remnants of the coverture legal structure well into the
twentieth.6 Following the legal dissolution of coverture in the United States,
and seemingly unrelated, was the criminalization of wiretapping in 1968 with
the Federal Wiretap Act,7 which codiﬁed Congress’ recognition of
developments in surveillance technology becoming generally accessible to
non-law-enforcement personnel. Although the language of the Wiretap Act
granted explicit exemptions for certain wiretappers, a handful of lower federal
court cases decided in subsequent years oﬀered another exemption: one for
spouses.8 This exemption allowed for one spouse to intercept the private
communications of the other and avoid both criminal and civil liability under
the Wiretap Act. This federal common law doctrine, known as the “spousal
exception” to the Federal Wiretap Act, still stands as good law in two Circuit
Courts of Appeals: the Fifth and the Second.9
The spousal wiretap exception reﬂects longstanding assumptions about
the marital relationship held at the time the Federal Wiretap Act was enacted.
I ﬁrst argue that coverture inﬂuenced early decisions regarding the spousal
wiretap exception, which eﬀectively allowed a husband to own his wife’s
private communications and use them however he chose, including to her own
detriment in family court proceedings. The notion that a wife’s private
communications are her husband’s property echoes common-law coverture,
which held that upon marriage, a wife’s legal identity and her personal
property come under her husband’s control. Therefore, a spousal wiretap
exception reﬂects the antiquated notion of marital unity: that a wife does not
have a right to her own personal communications. In eﬀect, the spousal
exception allows a husband to legally use the wife’s private communications
as evidence in contentious court proceedings, just as husbands could use their
wives’ property as their own under coverture.
Similarly, the law of individual privacy has changed drastically since the
spousal wiretap exception decisions. In the mid-twentieth century,
constitutional privacy law shifted from recognizing privacy only within the
marital relationship to recognizing that individuals retained privacy even after
marriage.10 Due to coverture’s lingering impacts, marital privacy initially remained
a unified right, and individual privacy was seen as being reserved for unmarried

6 See infra notes 94–99 and accompanying text (discussing the fall of coverture in the United States).
7 18 U.S.C §§ 2510–22.
8 See discussion infra Section I.B.
9 See infra notes 34–49 and accompanying text.
10 See discussion infra subsection II.B.1.

1096

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 170:1093

individuals.11 The spousal exception to the Wiretap Act flouts modern privacy law,
which preserves individual autonomy regardless of relationship status.12
In short, the spousal exception is hopelessly outdated and ignores the
developed legal landscape of gender, marital, and privacy law in the United
States. We now see that marriage has evolved from an institution built on the
notion that husbands are their wives’ keepers to a partnership in which each
spouse retains a certain level of autonomy over their private aﬀairs. Policy
considerations also counsel against a spousal wiretap exception, especially in
the digital age. Allowing for such an exception incentivizes spouses to
preemptively prepare for divorce or child support proceedings, encouraging
criminal conduct and eroding the foundations of trust characteristic of the
modern marriage relationship. With the development of widely accessible
spyware and surveillance software, savvy spouses can access the private
dealings of their partners at the click of a button,13 making this incentive
cheap with a potentially high payoﬀ.
With the spousal wiretap exception still available as a defense in certain
jurisdictions, the dangers of allowing this behavior to go unchecked are clear.
Codiﬁed protection from spousal surveillance at the state level is of the
utmost importance in preserving spousal privacy and omitting the use of such
evidence in family law proceedings.14
Part I of this work will ﬁrst introduce the Wiretap Act and its origins as
a method of protecting private communications from illegal monitoring and
will then outline the common law spousal wiretap exception that emerged
following the enactment of the Wiretap Act. To underscore the outdated
origins of the exception, Part II will discuss how the institution of marriage
and legal conceptions of privacy devolved in twentieth-century United States
from structures based on coverture and marital unity to those based on
constitutionally mandated sex equality and individual privacy rights.15 Part
Id.
See discussion infra subsection II.B.1.
See discussion infra Section III.B.
The use of wiretap evidence in family law proceedings is of concern to a large number of
family law attorneys. See, e.g., Does Wiretapping Your Spouse Break the Law?, KRUSCH L., PLLC (July
30, 2019), https://www.kruschlaw.com/blog/2019/july/does-wiretapping-your-spouse-break-the-law[https://perma.cc/38V8-V9DV] (cautioning against spousal wiretapping for legal proceedings);
Recording Conversations or Phone Calls in Divorce or Custody Cases, LAW & MEDIATION OFF. OF
DARREN M. SHAPIRO, ESQ., https://www.darrenshapiro.com/recording-conversations-or-phonecalls-in-divorce-or-child-custo.html [https://perma.cc/W88J-3RAW] (same). For those individuals
who have not yet obtained an attorney in their family law proceeding and aren’t actively being told
not to wiretap their spouse, it may seem logical to obtain the evidence ﬁrst and then ask if it’s allowed
in court later—after the true damage is already done.
15 This work focuses largely on the male and female spousal relationship, as it connects more
broadly to the historical views of what unions were legally and socially accepted moving into the
late twentieth century. However, it is of note that the consequences of approving a spousal wiretap
11
12
13
14
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III will then explain how the contemporary social and technological landscape
surrounding the spousal relationship renders the spousal wiretap exception
particularly damaging and obsolete. The Comment concludes by recommending
that state legislatures eliminate the exception through legislation explicitly
codifying its extinction.
I. THE SPOUSAL WIRETAP EXCEPTION
The Federal Wiretap Act’s enactment inadvertently created an issue that
remains severely underexplored by legal scholars. Although the Act does not
explicitly grant an exemption for wiretapping in domestic relationships by a
spouse, some Circuits have read one into the text. This Part examines the
statute’s history and language, and then discusses the origins and modern
caselaw surrounding this spousal wiretap exception.
A. The Wiretap Act
When Congress enacted the Federal Wiretap Act in 1968, wiretapping
had long been used as a law enforcement tool.16 Growing concerns over
oﬃcial abuses of power and the increasing availability of private wiretapping
catalyzed newfound Congressional focus on the issue.17 In passing the Act,
Congress intended to combat wiretapping “by government agencies and
private individuals without the consent of the parties or legal sanction.”18
1. Legislative History
The legislative commentary on the Wiretap Act indicates that Congress
intended the term “private individuals” to reach even the confines of the marital
home. Congressional findings accompanying the Act’s enactment explain that
the Wiretap Act “safeguard[s] the privacy of innocent persons” by prohibiting
the unauthorized interception of “wire and oral communications.”19 Although
exception would reach any marital relationship, regardless of sexual orientation. The following
arguments merely serve the purpose of illuminating the sexist foundations of the historical spousal
wiretap exception and the reasons behind why it should not be used as an aﬃrmative defense moving
forward. They are similarly applicable to same-sex marriage.
16 See April White, A Brief History of Surveillance in America, SMITHSONIAN MAG., Apr. 2018,
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/brief-history-surveillance-america-180968399
[https://perma.cc/7DZ6-X2UP] (pointing to Prohibition as the beginning of wiretapping for law
enforcement needs).
17 Id.
18 Title III of The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Wiretap Act), BUREAU
JUST. ASSISTANCE, https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1284
[https://perma.cc/3HAN-8F7J].
19 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801(b)-(d), 82
Stat. 197, 213 (1968).
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the ﬁnal legislative text does not include any mention of wiretapping within
the marital relationship, Scott Glick’s in-depth look at the Act’s legislative
history demonstrates that Congress considered marital communications as
covered by the Act.20 In his work, Glick identiﬁed a legislative hearing for the
Right of Privacy Act of 1967,21 a workshopped precursor to the Wiretap Act,
where then-professor Robert Blakey testiﬁed that private surveillance falls
into two major camps: “commercial espionage and domestic relations
investigations.”22 Glick identiﬁes Blakey’s testimony as foundational to the
surviving Wiretap Act, catalyzing the legislative shift in focus to provide for
a prohibition against domestic surveillance in the Act.23 According to Glick,
the Wiretap Act “was speciﬁcally designed to close the gap caused by the
[Right of Privacy Act of 1967’s] failure to prohibit electronic surveillance in
domestic relations situations.”24 This legislative background bolsters the
Wiretap Act’s prohibition on private electronic surveillance, including
surveillance conducted by a snooping spouse. However, despite the evidence,
some federal courts remained skeptical that lawmakers intended to regulate
wiretapping in marital relationships through the Wiretap Act.
2. Language of the Act
The Federal Wiretap Act, codiﬁed at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22, forbids the
intentional interception, use, and disclosure of real-time “wire, oral or
electronic communication[s]” by “any person.”25 For the statute to apply, a
communication must be intercepted using an electronic or mechanical device
while still in transit to its destination.26 Congress may have attempted to
discourage private individuals from wiretapping communications for legal
gain and incentivize law enforcement to follow the proper wiretap procedure
by enacting § 2515, which explicitly provided that the illegally intercepted
contents of a wiretap may not be used as evidence.27 Violations of the Act are

20 Scott J. Glick, Is Your Spouse Taping Your Telephone Calls?: Title III and Interspousal Electronic
Surveillance, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 845, 856-63 (1992) (assessing the legislative background of the
Wiretap Act).
21 113 Cong. Rec. 2910-12 (1967) (statement of Mr. Long of Miss.).
22 Right of Privacy Act of 1967: Hearings on S.928 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Prac. & Proc. of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 441 (1967); see also Glick, supra note 20, at 858 (identifying
Blakey as a key voice on the prevalence of marital surveillance during legislative hearings
surrounding wiretapping).
23 Glick, supra note 20, at 859-60.
24 Id. at 860.
25 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c)-(d).
26 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b).
27 18 U.S.C. § 2515.
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punished criminally, but the statute also provides for a civil cause of action
for wiretap victims.28
The Wiretap Act’s enumerated exceptions do not include spousal
communications. Indeed, the speciﬁed exceptions for individuals are for
switchboard operators and oﬃcers, employees, and agents of electronic
communication service providers.29 The only other means of avoiding civil or
criminal liability under the federal statute is if one of the parties to the
wiretap consents.30 Therefore, it is diﬃcult to see how a stealthy wiretapper
can avoid liability under the statute simply because they are intimately
involved with the person they are wiretapping. Even so, the suggestion of
potential liability for spouses under the Act was seen as abhorrent in certain
jurisdictions, sparking the creation of the spousal wiretap exception.
B. The Spousal Wiretap Exception
In opinions from the 1970s, shortly after the Federal Wiretap Act’s
enactment and at a critical turning point for marital law and women’s rights
in the United States, the Fifth and Second Circuits permitted spousal spying
under the Wiretap Act, reasoning that the special sanctity of the marriage
relationship aﬀorded spouses a right to each other’s communications.31
Although the statute seems to state clearly that any unauthorized and
unconsented interception of communications is illegal under the statute,32
spousal spying is, unfortunately, not a rare occurrence, and the reasons for
doing so may boil down to a lack of trust in the relationship.33 In certain
jurisdictions, this lack of trust (and the consequences ﬂowing from it) remain
unactionable in federal courts, regardless of the language of the Federal
Wiretap Act.

18 U.S.C. § 2520.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i).
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c).
See infra notes 34–49 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial foundations of the exception).
See supra subsection I.A.2.
See, e.g., Stefanie Smith, Survey Shows the Person You Trust the Most May be Spying on You,
AVAST (Sept. 3, 2014), https://blog.avast.com/2014/09/03/survey-shows-the-person-you-trust-themost-may-be-spying-on-you [https://perma.cc/K4SH-JZR9] (discussing a survey in which one in
ﬁve men and one in four women out of 13,132 respondents admitted to checking their partner’s
smartphone because they believed that their partner may be unfaithful).
28
29
30
31
32
33
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1. Origins
The Fifth34 and Second Circuits35 found spouses immune from civil and
criminal liability under the Wiretap Act when they conducted surveillance
on their partner.
The classic case in support of a marital exception to the Wiretap Act is
Simpson v. Simpson.36 In Simpson, a husband concerned about his wife’s
potential inﬁdelity attached a wiretap device to his marital home’s telephone
and intercepted compromising conversations between his wife and another
man.37 The husband played the recorded tapes to neighbors, family, and an
attorney, who subsequently advised the wife to agree to an uncontested
divorce.38 After analyzing the legislative history, the court concluded that
“because Congress ha[d] not, in the statute, committee reports, legislative
hearings, or reported debates indicated either its positive intent to reach so
far or an awareness that it might be doing so,” the Act should not reach into
the conﬁnes of the spousal relationship.39 Put simply, because Congress didn’t
mention the Act reaching the marital home, it could not be judicially
extended to do so.40 The court further noted that if the spouse had instead
used a third-party investigator to conduct the wiretap, they would not be
privy to the spousal exemption.41 To the Fifth Circuit, then, the zone of
privacy one has in their spousal relationship, secluded from their spouse, is
narrower than the zone of privacy protected from third-party intrusion.42
A similar Second Circuit case, Anonymous v. Anonymous, remains good law.43
In Anonymous, the plaintiff’s ex-husband recorded telephone conversations
between the plaintiff and the couple’s children using the answering machine’s
Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 810 (5th Cir. 1974).
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 677 (2d Cir. 1977).
490 F.2d 803.
Id. at 804.
Id.
Id. at 805.
Id. at 806 (“[W]e have found no direct indications that Congress intended so much, and
only several scattered suggestions that it was aware that the statute’s inclusive language might reach
this case.”).
41 Id. at 809 (“[A] third-party intrusion into the marital home, even if instigated by one spouse,
is an oﬀense against a spouse’s privacy of a much greater magnitude than is personal surveillance by
the other spouse.”).
42 To note, Simpson has technically been overturned by Glazner v. Glazner in the Eleventh
Circuit, as the ruling in Simpson came before the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits split in 1981. However,
there have been no further mentions of spousal wiretapping in the “new” 5th Circuit, so the
precedent remains binding in that jurisdiction. See Glazner v. Glazner, 347 F.3d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir.
2003) (“Therefore, we hold that no exception for interspousal wiretapping exists in Title III.
Accordingly, we overrule Simpson.”). For more background on how precedent is handled in the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuit split, see generally Thomas E. Baker, A Postscript on Precedent in the Divided Fifth Circuit,
36 SW. L.J. 725, 727 (1982).
43 Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977).
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
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call recording feature.44 These calls were then oﬀered as evidence in
preparation for divorce proceedings.45 The court reasoned that the husband’s
actions in this case “present[ed] a purely domestic conﬂict [sic] [and] dispute
between a wife and her ex-husband over the custody of their children—a
matter clearly to be handled by the state courts.”46 Only when conduct
exceeded that of a “marital dispute” and became the “criminal conduct” that
the Wiretap Act sought to prohibit could a spousal surveillance issue fall
under the purview of the Act.47 Indeed, the court was hesitant to make it a
crime “for a father to listen in on conversations between his wife and eight
year old daughter, from his own phone, in his own home.”48 Here, the court’s
test centered on the criminality of the conduct, a question of certain judicial
discretion not given any parameters. In qualifying its decision, however, the
court concluded that there was no blanket exception for spousal
surveillance—an important point that undermines the potential for a broad
acceptance of spousal immunity under the Wiretap Act.49
2. Current Standing Case Law
Lizza v. Lizza, a federal district court case, further supports a spousal
exception to the Wiretap Act.50 Like Simpson, Lizza involved an electronic
wiretap device, designed to pick up telephone conversations, affixed to the
marital phone.51 The recordings obtained from the telephone communications
were prepared for a future divorce proceeding.52 The court followed Simpson
and Anonymous, holding that extending the Wiretap Act to reach spousal
phone-tapping “would have serious ramiﬁcations as to the degree of federal
control over actions by family members within their own homes.”53 Like in
Simpson, the court reasoned that because there was no clear legislative intent
for the Act to apply to spousal surveillance, the Act couldn’t “extend to a
decision by a spouse to record conversations on [one’s] own residence’s
telephone.”54
Id. at 678.
Id. at 677.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 677 (“The issue becomes at what point interspousal wiretaps leave the province of
mere marital disputes, a matter left to the states, and rise to the level of criminal conduct proscribed
by the federal wiretap statutes.”).
48 Id. at 679.
49 Id. at 677 (“Congress was not unaware of the growing incidence of interspousal wiretaps,
and did not intend to blanketly except them from the Act’s coverage.”).
50 631 F. Supp. 529, 530 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
51 Id. at 530.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 533.
54 Id.
44
45
46
47
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Conversely, the Fourth,55 Sixth,56 and Tenth57 Circuits each expressly
disclaim the existence of a spousal exception to the federal Wiretap Act. Each
of the following cases involved a phone wiretapping device placed by either
the husband or wife, similar to that of both Simpson and Anonymous.58 In
Pritchard, the Fourth Circuit court noted that “an analysis of the legislative
history would not appear to be necessary” given the Act’s clear and
unambiguous statutory language.59 The court concluded that without a
speciﬁc exception written into the statute, spousal surveillance is not
permitted under the Act.60 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Jones recognized the
“unambiguous language of the [Wiretap Act]” but chose to conduct its own
look at the Act’s legislative history.61 Although viewing “many of the same
materials” reviewed by the Simpson court, the court in Jones determined “that
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) establishes a broad prohibition on all private electronic
surveillance and that a principal area of congressional concern was electronic
surveillance for the purposes of marital litigation.”62 Finally, the Tenth
Circuit in Thompson reiterated that the clear language of the statute does not
allow for a spousal exception because the Act refers to “any person,” so “no
interspousal exception to Title III liability” exists.63
A recent case in the Sixth Circuit, Luis v. Zang,64 presents additional
support for eliminating the spousal wiretap exception because it illuminates
the unique issue of spousal surveillance in the digital age.65 Prior to the circuit
court’s decision in Luis, the paramour of the husband defendant’s (now ex)
wife brought suit in district court against both the husband and the creator
of the surveillance software he used to intercept electronic communications
Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1984).
United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
Thompson v. Dulaney, 970 F.2d 744 (10th Cir. 1992).
See Pritchard, 732 F.2d at 372 (“[Plaintiﬀ] alleges that his former wife . . . intercepted and
used his telephone conversations by attaching a wiretapping device to the family phone. Plaintiﬀ
claims that his conversations were recorded without his knowledge or consent.”); Jones, 542 F.2d at
663 (“[O]n one or more occasions Appellee had intercepted his wife’s telephone conversations
outside the curtilage of the residence.”); Thompson, 970 F.2d at 746 (“[Plaintiﬀ] discovered that
[defendant] had taped several of his telephone conversations with the couple’s minor children who
had been living with [the defendant].”).
59 Pritchard, 732 F.2d at 373.
60 Id. at 374 (“Title III prohibits all wiretapping activities unless specifically excepted. There is
no express exception for instances of willful, unconsented to electronic surveillance between spouses.”).
61 Jones, 542 F.2d at 666-69 (identifying legislator comments, expert testimony, and the Bill’s
senate report as the basis for the court’s conclusions).
62 Id. at 669-70.
63 Thompson, 970 F.2d at 748.
64 833 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2016).
65 The age of digital spousal surveillance presents newfound concerns of layperson access to
powerful surveillance software and the potential interception of private information outside of
communications with a third party. See discussion infra Section III.B.
55
56
57
58
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on the wife’s computer, alleging violations of the Wiretap Act.66 In addition
to using the surveillance software to spy on his wife, the defendant husband
used the intercepted communications as leverage in his divorce proceeding.67
Though the plaintiﬀ settled with the husband prior to the appellate decision,
the appellate court used its platform to subtly disregard a potential spousal
exception to the Wiretap Act, opining that the plaintiﬀ had a cause of action
under § 2511(a) because the husband, though not actively monitoring the
communications in real-time himself, intercepted his wife’s real-time
communications with the surveillance software.68 The court’s decision
nodded to the fact that the defendant’s position as spouse during the
wiretapping did not necessarily shield him from liability under the Act.69
Instead, his actions were regarded as those of a private individual to whom
the Act fully applied. Therefore, this recent look at technologically advanced
spousal surveillance, and the majority of Circuit courts that reject any spousal
exception to the Wiretap Act, provides further support for doing away with
a spousal exception entirely.
Notwithstanding modern case law, the spousal wiretap exception still
stands as good law in the Fifth and Second Circuits. Until those cases are
overturned, spouses in those jurisdictions have no recourse under the Federal
Wiretap Act. The Act indicates that spouses were not meant to be exempt
from its language,70 and the theoretical foundations for the exception,
outlined in Simpson and Anonymous, are ﬂawed. Furthermore, the spousal
wiretap exception set forth in these cases is wholly incompatible with
constitutional, legal, and social developments since the 1970s.
II. AN ANCIENT EXCEPTION
The constantly evolving areas of marital and privacy rights demand focus
in this Comment’s discussion of how the spousal wiretap exception is no
longer good law. The marital rights discussion identiﬁes two distinct
ideological shifts emerging concurrently with the spousal wiretap exception:
Luis, 833 F.3d at 623.
See id. at 624 (“[The husband] then used these communications as leverage to help his
attorney secure favorable terms for a divorce from [his wife] in 2010.”).
68 See id. at 633 (“Any potential delay in access to the communications for a [software] user
therefore does not preclude a ﬁnding that [the software creator] itself acquire[d] the
communications in a manner contemporaneous with their transmission.”).
69 See id. at 639 (“[E]ven if a jury ultimately concludes that only [the husband] (and not [the
software creator]) intercepted [plaintiff ’s] communications in violation of § 2511, [the software creator]
might still be liable because it ‘engaged in’ that violation (see § 2520) by manufacturing, marketing,
selling, and actively operating the device that was used by [the husband] to conduct the intercept.”).
70 See United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 671 (1976) (“If Congress had intended to create
another exception to Title III’s blanket prohibition of unauthorized wiretaps they would have
included a speciﬁc exception for interspousal wiretaps in the statute.”).
66
67
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one being a shift from sex-inequality to sex-equality, and the other a shift
away from marital unity to marital individualism. Both of these concepts are
also present in the subsequent discussion of privacy rights.
A. United States’ Evolution of Rights Within the Marital Relationship
In the early days of the Republic, marriage was viewed as an institution
through which publicly deﬁned duties could be prescribed and rewards could
be redeemed when the union was consummated.71 Consent on both sides of
the “marriage contract” was imperative.72 This consent gave way to the
“beneﬁts” of being in an acknowledged partnership: a husband would provide
for the wife and, in return, a wife owed her service and labor to him.73 A
particular model of marriage, consistent with societal views at the Nation’s
founding, is described by Nancy Cott in her work, Public Vows: A History of
Marriage and the Nation.74 Marriage, meant to be a lasting and committed
union between man and woman, rested upon principles of “Christian religion
and the English common law in its expectations for the husband to be the
family head and economic provider, his wife the dependent partner.”75
Although secularism took precedence in the new nation, the religious
foundations of marriage remained prominent.76 This meant that the vision of
a male head of household also remained prominent, resulting in a structure
that encouraged dependent wives.77
This structural division between husband and wife was meant to reﬂect
the diﬀerences that purportedly existed between men and women. While
men were “[superior] in reason and judgment,” women were malleable beings
whose manners and social cues could be taught.78 This alleged superiority in
matters involving intellectual prudence painted husbands as being better
equipped for things such as managing property and handling legal disputes.79
In essence, because the wives weren’t capable of handling these “superior” matters,
it was their marital duty to give up control over these matters to their husbands.
71 See NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 2, 10-11
(2002) (“Marriage prescribes duties and dispenses privileges.”).
72 Id. at 10-11.
73 Id. at 12.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 3.
76 See id. at 6 (explaining that, although the United States does not recognize a national
religion, a Christian conception of marriage was “adopted in and ﬁltered through legislation”).
77 See id. at 7 (“A man’s headship of a family, his taking the responsibility for dependent wife
and children, qualiﬁed him to be a participating member of a state.”).
78 Id. at 19, 20; see also Joan Hoﬀ, American Women and the Lingering Implications of Coverture,
44 SOC. SCI. J. 41, 44 (2007) (noting the patriarchal notion that women are biologically inferior and
cannot handle “public tasks of importance”).
79 See infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
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Notions of marital unity, emphasized through common law coverture and
interspousal tort immunity, perpetuated female subordination.80 Seen as “less
than” their husbands, society deemed women unworthy of retaining autonomy
over their possessions, their legal rights, and their bodies. The following
discussions of these legal areas indicate that female subordination remained a
prominent societal force at the time the spousal wiretap exception was created.
Considering the changes in constitutional law that dispel female subordination,
the spousal wiretap exception is repugnant to established legal standards of
gender equality.
It should also be noted that historically, courts (including the court in
Simpson) used the domestic relations doctrine, a federal common law
recognition of state prominence in the areas of marriage, divorce, and the
like,81 to disclaim federal involvement in marital disputes. However, federal
courts can give deference to constitutional domestic relations doctrine while
recognizing that Congress meant to encompass spousal wiretapping in the
Wiretap Act. This work also addresses the domestic relations argument in turn.82
1. Coverture
The common law doctrine of coverture enforced the societal notion that
a woman was incapable of existing as an entity outside of the “cover” of her
husband. In his ﬁrst volume of Commentaries on the Laws of England, William
Blackstone explained that “[b]y marriage, the husband and wife are one
person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is
suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated
into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she
performs everything . . . .”83 Under coverture, the marital union triggered a
transfer of the woman’s personal property to the husband, where he was
“permitted to dispose of it at any time.”84 In addition, once married, women
lacked the ability to sue another individual or be sued herself—legal actions

80 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117, 2144 (1996) (“The household remained patriarchal in form, ‘a little commonwealth’ in
which the master ruled the members (wife, children, servants, etc.) and represented them in the
larger commonwealth.”); see also id. at 2145 (“[F]or most of the [nineteenth] century, Americans
understood marriage as a relationship organized in terms of authority and aﬀect.”). For an excellent
account of how historic notions of marriage were focused on patriarchal authority and lingered well
into the twentieth century, see generally Lenore J. Weitzman, To Love, Honor, and Obey? Traditional
Legal Marriage and Alternative Family Forms, 24 THE FAM. COORDINATOR 531, 532 (1975).
81 See discussion infra subsection II.A.3 (outlining the origins of the domestic relations doctrine).
82 See discussion infra subsection II.A.3 (discussing the domestic relations exception).
83 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *625-26.
84 Hazem Alshaikhmubarak, R. Richard Geddes & Shoshana A. Grossbard, Single Motherhood
and the Abolition of Coverture in the United States, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 94, 96 (2019).
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against a wife or for a wife needed to go through the husband.85 In essence,
without property to claim and money in her name, a wife was rendered
powerless in marriage. Marriage became an economic bargain, a “preeminent”
feature of “daily community life.”86 If a woman remained unmarried, social
stigma87 and a dearth of ﬁnancial support could result in unfavorable
prospects. If married to a husband who mismanaged the property that he
absorbed from her at the start of the marital relationship, she could lose
everything she originally had to her name, reinforcing the dependency that
coverture sought to maintain within the union between man and wife.
In the early years of the United States, the States implicitly adopted
coverture through an embrace of English common law.88 On the state court
level, judges decided property rights cases and contract disputes where the
wives were under coverture’s “disability.”89 The federal courts operated under
a similar impression that coverture was a common law disabling force for
women.90 Notably, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story in Shanks v. Dupont
85 See Allison Anna Tait, The Beginning of the End of Coverture: A Reappraisal of the Married
Woman’s Separate Estate, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 165, 167 (2014) (stating that the “legal existence”
of a woman was “suspended” during her marriage).
86 COTT, supra note 71, at 12.
87 Unmarried women in the late 19th century were considered a “threat to men and the family.”
Ruth Freeman and Patricia Klaus, Blessed or Not? The New Spinster in England and the United States in
the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 9 J. FAM. HIST. 394, 395 (1984).
88 See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXV (“[S]uch parts of the common law of England, and
of the statute law of England and Great Britain, and of the acts of the legislature of the colony of
New-York, as together did form the law of the said colony . . . shall be and continue the law of this
State . . . .”). Other colonies, such as Pennsylvania and Virginia, also enacted similar statutes that
remain in force. See VA. CODE ANN. § 1-200 (2021) (“The common law of England, insofar as it is
not repugnant to the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth, shall
continue in full force within the same, and be the rule of decision, except as altered by the General
Assembly.”); 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1503(a) (2021) (“The common law and such of the statutes of
England as were in force in the Province of Pennsylvania on May 14, 1776 and . . . shall be deemed
to have been in force in this Commonwealth from and after February 10, 1777.”).
89 See, e.g., Archer v. Griﬃth, 390 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tex. 1964) (“Petitioner argues that the
contract in the present case is now binding on respondent because she adopted the same by executing
the deed after her disabilities of coverture were removed.”); Banﬁeld v. Addington, 140 So. 893, 900
(Fla. 1932) (“The statutes by enabling the married woman to engage in the employment or
occupation ‘separate from her husband,’ to that extent removed her common-law disability of
coverture and rendered her liable as though she were not married for torts committed in the conduct
of such employment or occupation.”); Jackson ex dem. Swartwout v. Johnson, 5 Cow. 74, 74 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1825) (holding that the statute of limitations should not run against the owner of property
that was reassigned to her husband while she was “under disability” coverture until “the removal of
her disabilit[y]”).
90 See, e.g., Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255, 273 (1986) (referring to a wife as being “under
the disability of coverture” in a proceeding on adverse possession); MacGreal v. Taylor, 167 U.S.
688, 697 (1897) (“Mrs. Sims labored under the disability of coverture when she made the deed
. . . .”); Teas v. Kimball, 257 F.2d 817, 824 (5th Cir. 1958) (“[A] married woman who has not had her
disabilities of coverture removed pursuant to Art. 4626, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.Stat., is incapable of
entering into a mercantile partnership.”); Decker v. Kedly, 148 F. 681, 681 (9th Cir. 1906) (“It is true
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acknowledged that after becoming a sub potestate viri,91 any subsequent acts of
a woman were no longer considered “free.”92 Indeed, the common law
presumed “that the wife was ‘acting by her husband’s compulsion’ . . . [and]
could not commit any voluntary act . . . .”93 Wives were, in a sense, reduced
to pieces of property owned by their husbands.
State statutory alterations of the common law were necessary to dismantle
coverture in the United States. Legislators recognized the vulnerability that
married women faced under the common law.94 Coverture structures in the
United States weakened with the passage of the Married Women’s Property
Acts and Married Women’s Earning Acts which aﬀorded “married women the
right to own and control real and personal property” and “the right to own
their earnings from work outside the home,” respectively.95 The last of these
acts were passed in Arizona in 1973.96
Both state and federal courts played a similar role in the fall of coverture.
State court jurisprudence followed a trajectory similar to the statutory
dismantling.97 Additionally, the Supreme Court echoed sentiments against
coverture in the 1966 case United States v. Yazell, noting that “[t]he institution
of coverture is peculiar and obsolete.”98 However, a concurrence by Justice
Blackmun (joined by Justices Burger, Harlan, and Stewart) in the 1971
that the statutes of Alaska, as do those of many of the states, remove certain disabilities which at
common law attend the wife during her coverture . . . .”).
91 Sub potestate viri is short for the Latin phrase Uxor non est sui juris sed sub potestate viri, meaning
“[a] wife is not in her own right . . . but under the power of her husband.” Uxor non est sui juris sed
sub potestate viri, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
92 28 U.S. 242, 258 (1830) (“It is the only free act of her life stated upon the record, for from
thence she continued sub potestate viri . . . .”). For a clearer look at Justice Story’s take on the
position of the wife within the marriage relationship, see Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17
U.S. 518, 696-97 (1819).
93 Kristin A. Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early Tradition of Federal Family Law and the
Invention of States’ Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761, 1779 (2005).
94 See Bernie D. Jones, Revisiting the Married Women’s Property Acts: Recapturing Protection in the Face of
Equality, 22 AM. UNIV. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 91, 92 (2013) (discussing that legislators understood
that a husband’s right to his wife’s property created risk that a husband’s debts could be seized).
95 Alshaikhmubarak et al., supra note 84, at 96. See also Allison Anna Tait, The Return of
Coverture, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 99, 101 (2015) (“[Coverture] governed married
women in . . . America until at least the middle of the nineteenth century, when states began to
enact Married Women’s Property Acts, legislation that is generally thought to have ended
coverture.”). The ﬁrst of these acts were passed in New York and Maryland in the mid-nineteenth
century. See Alshaikhmubarak et al., supra note 84, at 97.
96 Alshaikhmubarak et al., supra note 84, at 97.
97 See Clouston v. Remlinger Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc., 258 N.E.2d 230, 235 (Ohio 1970)
(rejecting an argument that a wife and husband couldn’t separately seek damages for a single
negligence action on the basis of coverture, which the judge recognized as degrading women to
“chattel with no personality, no property and no legally recognized feelings or rights”); see also
Whyman v. Johnston, 163 P. 76, 77 (Colo. 1917) (stating that the idea of a marriage as “one legal
personality” was “ﬁction”).
98 382 U.S. 341, 351 (1966).
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Supreme Court case Perez v. Campbell recognized the force of an Arizona
property law perpetuating principles of coverture without a similar
disapproving tone.99 This accurately reflected judicial attitudes at the time—
although coverture’s legal roots were being pulled from the ground, the social
sentiment would still linger in the minds of Americans because, in many
jurisdictions, this legal treatment of women was considered a progressive concept.
The deep-seated prejudice against married women as independent
individuals persisted despite legal developments to the contrary. It was not
until the early 1970s that the U.S. Supreme Court eliminated formal sexbased distinctions between husbands and wives as a matter of constitutional
law. In Frontiero v. Richardson, a plurality of the Supreme Court applied strict
scrutiny to a law that made it more diﬃcult for military servicewomen to
claim spouses as dependents and gain access to certain beneﬁts and allowances
that would be available to the wives of servicemen.100 In holding that the law
did not survive strict scrutiny, the Court noted, and rebuked, the notion that
“discrimination [on the basis of sex] was rationalized by an attitude of
‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical eﬀect, put women, not on a
pedestal, but in a cage.”101 The Court similarly rejected statutes that based
availability of beneﬁts on gender classiﬁcations in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld102
and Califano v. Goldfarb,103 solidifying the Court’s movement away from
eﬀecting female subordination. As a result, at least as a matter of formal law,
coverture dissolved, placing wives and husbands on an equal legal footing.
However, the spousal wiretap cases decided concurrently ﬂouted these
new constitutional sex equality doctrines. Read in light of the constitutional
sex equality principle, it seems clear that a spousal wiretap exception
perpetuates sex inequality by granting a husband access to his wife’s personal
communications under the outdated doctrine of marital unity. Although a
skeptic may argue that the spousal wiretap exception is facially genderneutral, as the cases do not qualify the defense’s availability on being male or
female, the practical eﬀects favored husbands in (a) asserting the defense and
(b) bringing action against their wives.104 Women at the time were legally able
to operate outside the cover of their husbands, but this constitutionally
99 402 U.S. 637, 669 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (writing approvingly that the personality
of the husband and wife in the community is under the authority of the husband).
100 411 U.S. 677, 678-83 (1973).
101 Id. at 684.
102 420 U.S. 636, 638-39 (1975).
103 430 U.S. 199, 202 (1977).
104 There is at least one case from the 1980s discussing the spousal wiretap exception that
involves a wife wiretapping her husband. See Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 372 (4th Cir.
1984) (“[Plaintiff] alleges that his former wife . . . intercepted and used his telephone
conversations . . . .”). However, this is one case among many involving a husband wiretapping his
wife, indicating that men were more poised to take advantage of the spousal wiretap defense.
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mandated equality105 focused on the interactions between the wife and the
outside world—not between the wife and her husband. “[I]n all states, the
common law still disabled a wife from dealing with her husband on such
terms.”106 Therefore, historic coverture was simply reinforced under the guise
of preserving the marital relationship, as the husband was more equipped to
take advantage of the defense.107
2. Interspousal Tort Immunity
One signiﬁcant legal consequence of coverture was the development of
interspousal tort immunity. Connected to the tenant of coverture that women
did not have standing to sue on their own behalf,108 the doctrine of
interspousal tort immunity directs that spouses are not able to pursue “civil
causes of action against each other for personal injuries.”109 The doctrine,
much like coverture, was not created statutorily. Instead, it was evoked as a
common law rule that many judges used to simply deny relief to women who
sued their husbands in tort.110 Some judges defended their use of the
interspousal tort immunity rule, suggesting that procedural disabilities
perpetuated by coverture were to blame, as the rule rendered a wife unable to
bring a suit on her own behalf.111 Similarly, even if damages were awarded
after a successful suit, the award would immediately become the property of
the husband—another facet of coverture.112 Wives with genuine causes of
action were stuck between a rock and a hard place—they were forced to
endure potentially violent or malicious conduct by their husbands because the
only way out of the relationship was through them.
Seven jurisdictions in the United States eliminated interspousal tort
immunity at the beginning of the twentieth century and by 1970 it was the
minority rule, remaining in only a handful of jurisdictions.113 The enactment
of the aforementioned Married Women’s Property Acts and Married
Women’s Earning Acts paved the way for the gradual abolishment of
See supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text.
Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing
State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1117 (1997).
107 Reva Siegel generally coined this concept “preservation-through-transformation,” where a
body of law is altered just enough to be “diﬀerentiated from its contested predecessor” in a way that
does not seriously disadvantage those that beneﬁtted from the prior regime. Id. at 1119.
108 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
109 See generally Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359, 359
(1989) (explaining the connection between coverture and interspousal tort immunity).
110 Id. at 385 (“Most judges simply announced . . . the existence of a substantive common-law
rule of interspousal tort immunity, although there technically was no rule as such.”).
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 359.
105
106
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interspousal tort immunity throughout the rest of the nation, as these pieces
of legislation granted women the power to maintain civil actions against
anyone “in her own name, for damages,” as a result of injuries against “her
person or character.”114 However, this abolishment was not quick to take hold.
Some early judicial determinations of legislative intent refused to ﬁnd an
implied grant of action by one spouse against another.115 Absent a “clear”
directive that the doctrine was to be abrogated, judges were hesitant to stray
from the common law.116 Instead, legislation was construed in light of the
common law—meaning that even though wives were granted control over
their property and earnings by the married women’s statutes and could bring
suit on causes of action surrounding those areas of the law, it did not
automatically follow that women had a right of action in all areas of the law,
including tort law, against their husbands.117
Outside of their analysis on legislative intent, judges were hesitant to do
away with interspousal tort immunity on other grounds. First, they claimed
that wives already had available remedies for tortious actions by the husband:
divorce law and criminal law.118 Of course, divorce law only provides a means
of dissolving the relationship and potentially receiving maintenance or
alimony payments (and, if applicable, child support), but it cannot directly
compensate for an injury like civil actions in tort can.119 Monetary damages
are generally not awarded as part of the recovery in divorce proceedings,
which means that tortious actions against one partner cannot directly be
remedied.120 Finally, the decision to pursue a criminal charge on behalf of a
Id. at 373, 383.
See, e.g., Main v. Main, 46 Ill. App. 106, 108-09 (1892) (holding that although wives could
now maintain an action regarding property or contracts, departing from the common law of
interspousal tort immunity for reasons of violence by a husband against a wife would “not [be]
desirable . . .”); Bandﬁeld v. Bandﬁeld, 75 N.W. 287, 288 (Mich. 1898) (“The result of plaintiﬀ ’s
contention [that the interspousal tort immunity doctrine is invalid] would be another step to destroy
the sacred relation of man and wife, and to open the door to lawsuits between them for every real
and fancied wrong,—suits which the common law has refused on the ground of public policy.”),
overruled in part by Hosko v. Hosko, 187 N.W.2d 236 (Mich. 1971).
116 See Flogel v. Flogel, 133 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Iowa 1965) (“The amendment gives no indication
of any legislative intent to abrogate the interspousal immunity rule. If it is to be done we are
committed to the proposition the legislature must do so in such clear language as to leave no doubt
in the mind of anyone.”).
117 Tobias, supra note 109, at 387-88.
118 Cf. Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771, 773-76 (Wash. 1972) (identifying several common
arguments in support of interspousal tort immunity before rejecting all of them), overruled by Brown
v. Brown, 675 P.2d 1207 (Wash. 1984).
119 See 4 A.L.R. Fed. 5th § 2[a] (“[T]he purpose of divorce actions is to dissolve the marital
relationship and eﬀect the legal separation of husband and wife, while a tort action is brought to
recover damages for injuries suﬀered as the result of a civil wrong.”).
120 One justification for keeping marital tort proceedings and divorce proceedings from being
joined in one action is the need to keep requests for damages prohibited in divorce proceedings. See id.
114
115
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victim spouse remains with the prosecutor,121 and charges against spouses are
often dropped or dismissed.122 For a spouse looking for vindication, then, not
having control over a criminal charge makes it an unsuitable replacement for
an action in tort.
Judges also justiﬁed interspousal tort immunity as promoting a strong,
harmonious union between man and wife through the common law. The
Supreme Court of Nevada noted that the doctrine, when in full force, was
thought to “foster[] domestic tranquility.”123 Essentially, allowing spouses to
sue each other for torts committed within the marital relationship would
erode the basic principles of marital unity.124
In addition, judges reasoned that the doctrine served to “prevent[] fraud
and collusion” by the wife independently and in conjunction with another.125
However, the court in the Arizona case of Burns v. Burns pointed out that
intentional torts are not covered by insurance, so if a wife was seeking
recovery for a violent or mal-intended tort committed by her husband,
insurance would not be a factor in the overall remedy determination and could
not be a genuine justiﬁcation for the doctrine.126 A ﬁnal policy argument
oﬀered by the courts suggested that allowing for interspousal tort actions
would create an overﬂow of baseless suits in the judicial system, as petty
arguments are common in relationships.127 However, some courts denying the
application of the interspousal tort immunity doctrine in the mid-twentieth
century argued that “[t]here is nothing in the experience of the dozens or
more jurisdictions . . . [that] do permit spouses to sue one another which

121 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.2 (4th ed. 2017)
(“While the decision to arrest is often the responsibility of law enforcement personnel, the decision
to institute formal criminal proceedings is the responsibility of the prosecutor.”).
122 The outcomes in violent domestic violence cases can serve as a general comparative group for nonviolent spouse-on-spouse crime. See, e.g., Sarah Buduson, Case Dismissed: Why Domestic Violence Offenders Often
Get Away With It, NEWS 5 CLEVELAND, https://www.news5cleveland.com/news/local-news/investing
ations/case-dismissed-why-domestic-violence-offenders-often-get-away-with-it [https://perma.cc/WYJ6-M
HBU] (finding that 66% of domestic violence cases in Cleveland were dismissed in 2018); Claire Lowe, Why
80 Percent of New Jersey’s Domestic Violence Cases Are Dismissed, PRESS OF ATL. CITY (Apr. 11, 2017),
https://pressofatlanticcity.com/news/crime/why-80-percent-of-new-jerseys-domestic-violence-cases-are-dis
missed/article_d9878dce-e162-5f98-8d6a-95eee8cb8884.html [https://perma.cc/TZR8-54R4] (“Eight in 10
municipal domestic violence cases in the state are dismissed, according to 2015 New Jersey Courts data.”).
123 Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Nev. 1974).
124 See Fischer v. Fischer, 477 S.W.2d 513, 514 (Tenn. 1972) (“While modern attitudes toward
marriage and the home and family and woman’s liberation tend to disparage the relationship and its
unity, in our opinion the rule is for the best good of the marital relationship.”).
125 Rupert, 528 P.2d at 1015; see also Burns v. Burns, 526 P.2d 717, 719 (Ariz. 1974) (“[T]here
would be a danger of fraud or collusion where the tort is covered by insurance . . . .”).
126 Burns, 526 P.2d at 720.
127 Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (Wash. 1972).
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would indicate that court calendars have become cluttered with trivial
matrimonial disputes.”128
Interspousal tort immunity, though now a minority rule in the United
States, displays how deeply tenets of coverture ran even after married
women’s laws began to dismantle the common law system. With courts well
into the 1970s and beyond deciding that wives could not bring personal tort
actions against their husbands, it was clear that prejudice against women as
independent legal entities remained prominent in the minds of many judges
and other legal decisionmakers.
This discussion illuminates the stage that had previously been set for the
spousal wiretap exception. Although the gradual dismantling of legal
paternalism had begun, there were still legal minds that begged to diﬀer on
whether a cause of action was even available for a spouse subjected to a
wiretap by their partner. As a result, the foundations of common law
doctrines such as coverture and interspousal tort immunity were interwoven
into the spousal wiretap exception. Now that both doctrines are legally and
socially obsolete, the foundations of the spousal wiretap exception have
eroded as well.
3. The Domestic Relations Exception
The domestic relations doctrine reﬂects coverture’s insistence on marital
unity and unwillingness to allow for federal intrusion into the marital home.
However, it is not a catch-all doctrine that applies to all domestic relations
issues, namely, spousal wiretapping.
The court in Simpson stated its view of the domestic relations doctrine:
spousal surveillance touches on “the marital home and domestic conﬂicts,”
two areas that typically fall under the purview of the states.129 The court’s
reasoning seemed to be that a federal statute could not regulate conduct
within the marital home because only the states had the power to regulate
domestic relations, therefore making it impossible for the statute’s reach to
encompass spouses.130 I illuminate below why this facet of the court’s
reasoning fails to pass muster in light of the domestic relations exception.
In the 1888 Supreme Court decision Maynard v. Hill, the Court aﬃrmed
the legislature’s control over the marital institution.131 The legislatures
referred to in the opinion were those of the states, not of the federal
Goode v. Martinis, 361 P.2d 941, 944 (Wash. 1961).
Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 805 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id.
125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (“Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having
more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been
subject to the control of the legislature.”).
128
129
130
131
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government.132 This recognition of power mirrored the simultaneous
development of the doctrine of domestic relations, which proscribed the
federal courts from hearing certain cases that traditionally fell under the state
police powers.133 Derived from the Tenth Amendment, the powers were
granted to the states to “police” areas not enumerated as federal government
powers in the Constitution, known as the “reserved powers.”134 The police
powers encompass issues regarding “the public health, the public morals, or
the public safety,”135 including marriage.136
The domestic relations doctrine originally ﬂowed directly from this grant
of police power to the States over marriage. In Barber v. Barber, the Court
made clear that divorce is not an area of federal jurisdiction.137 Scholar
Michael Ashley Stein identiﬁes Barber as the origin of the domestic relations
exception.138 Under this exception, matters primarily involving “declarations
of status such as marriage, divorce, alimony, custody, and their attendant
obligations” (what Stein refers to as “core” cases) are perceived to lack federal
court jurisdiction because of accepted state prominence in familial disputes.139
According to Stein, “non-primary core” cases, in contrast, involve matters
where a domestic dispute is part of the matter but is not at the core of the
case, and are often litigated in federal courts.140 Proponents of extending the
domestic relations exception to non-primary core cases cite “special state
interest and expertise, disdain toward family law, and federal docket
congestion.”141 In contrast, those who seek to maintain federal jurisdiction
132 Id. at 206-07 (“This power has been exercised from the earliest period by the legislatures
of the province, and by that of the State . . . .”).
133 Bradley G. Silverman, Federal Questions and the Domestic-Relations Exception, 125 YALE L.J.
1364, 1366 (2016) (“Under the domestic-relations exception to federal jurisdiction, federal courts lack
the power to hear certain cases involving family-law questions that fall within the traditional
authority of the states.”).
134 U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
135 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Illinois ex rel. Grimwood, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906).
136 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (“[M]arriage is a social relation subject to the
State’s police power . . . .”).
137 Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 582 (1858) (“This court disclaims altogether any jurisdiction
in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce . . . .”).
138 Michael Ashley Stein, The Domestic Relations Exception to Federal Jurisdiction: Rethinking an
Unsettled Federal Courts Doctrine, 36 B.C. L. REV. 669, 672 (1995).
139 Id. at 669 & n.3.
140 Id. at 705 (stating the principle that non-primary core cases fall under the purview of federal
jurisdiction); see also, e.g., Barber, 62 U.S. at 584 (specifying that the case is deciding questions of
domicile and proper venue, not questions of “the general rights, obligations, or disabilities, of either
[husband or wife], when they have been separated by a divorce”).
141 Stein, supra note 138, at 705. While these policy considerations are associated with
maintaining federal diversity jurisdiction over these matters, they are generally applicable to general
federal jurisdiction over domestic disputes as well. See, e.g., Silverman, supra note 133, at 1391-92
(“[A]pplying the [domestic relations] exception to federal questions preserves the autonomy of
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over these types of cases highlight “the growing national nature of family
law.”142 A growing number of legal scholars advocate for the latter.143
I argue that spousal wiretapping falls into the “non-primary core”
category because domestic disputes are not at the core of these matters;
instead, marital status is secondary to the act of wiretapping. Where marriage
is of secondary concern to the broader national issue of wiretapping, it is
diﬃcult to argue that cases involving both areas should only be left to the
states to regulate because they typically handle domestic relations. Spousal
wiretapping is a clear example of how family law no longer touches only the
marital residence and now has far-reaching implications. When a spouse
conducts surveillance on their partner for the purpose of gathering evidence,
they are inevitably reaching into the communications of a (potentially
diverse) third party144 and using interstate commerce-aﬀecting consumer
software or machinery,145 two key considerations that weigh against
exempting spousal wiretapping from federal regulation. The federal nature of
wiretapping prevails over concerns regarding the marital relationship.
It may be argued that the existence of a marital relationship is integral to
the spousal exception analysis and therefore must be a primary core concern.
However, marriage is not a central component of the Wiretap Act’s statutory
framework. Any particular circumstances of the wiretap (for example,
whether the tapper is the spouse of the tappee) outside of (1) an individual
(2) using some means to intercept (3) real-time communications146 generally
are not relevant to establishing liability under the Wiretap Act. Because a
federal law is implicated by the main act of wiretapping, the fact that the
individual conducting the wiretap was the spouse of the victim automatically
falls to the wayside as it is not what brings the action within federal
jurisdiction. Applying the non-primary core framework to the spousal
wiretap issue, then, Simpson’s argument that the federal government should
not be read to regulate spousal wiretapping fails.
states to deﬁne public policy respecting the family . . . [as they] have greater expertise and
competence [in this area] . . . .”).
142 Stein, supra note 138, at 705.
143 See, e.g., Emily J. Sack, The Domestic Relations Exception, Domestic Violence, and Equal Access
to Federal Courts, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1441, 1489 (2006) (rejecting the policy rationales for the
domestic relations exception); Steven G. Calabresi & Genna L. Sinel, The Same-Sex Marriage Cases
and Federal Jurisdiction: On Third-Party Standing and Why the Domestic Relations Exception to Federal
Jurisdiction Should Be Overruled, 70 U. MIA. L. REV. 708, 713 (2016) (concluding that the Supreme
Court should eliminate the domestic relations exception).
144 See, e.g., Luis v. Zang, 833 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2016)(explaining that the plaintiﬀ, whose
privacy had been violated, lived in Florida while the married couple lived in Ohio).
145 See, e.g., Internet Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 744, 109th Cong. § 4(b)
(2005) (emphasizing that the use of spyware implicates interstate commerce).
146 See supra notes 25–30 and accompanying text.
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Of course, this is not to say that states should have no say in the matter.
In fact, states do create their own wiretap laws and may have an even more
important role to play in the legwork of ensuring that spouses are deterred
from conducting these wiretaps altogether.
B. Evolution of Privacy Law
Like sex equality law, the modern doctrine of individual privacy renders
a spousal wiretap exception obsolete. Since the early 1970s, courts have
clariﬁed that privacy rights adhere to individuals and have undermined the
doctrine of marital unity.
Privacy rights in the United States generally derive from constitutional
law, tort law, and federal data privacy statutes.147 These areas diﬀer
signiﬁcantly in that tort law is largely left up to the states to enact and
enforce,148 while constitutional law is, generally, central to the federal
judiciary. Additionally, federal privacy statutes are Congress’ means of
regulating how personal data is handled in various sectors.149 Statutory
privacy rights are not exclusively related to data collection. Indeed, the
language of the federal Wiretap Act is a clear example of how Congress works
to protect individual privacy from the infringement of another party
attempting to illegally access communications.150
Both constitutional and statutory law support a right to individual privacy
that marriage does not eliminate.
1. Constitutional and Spousal
Constitutional privacy law is distinctly rooted in notions of personal
autonomy and liberty. Building from landmark spatial privacy cases, such as

147 See Yvonne F. Lindgren, Personal Autonomy: Towards a New Taxonomy for Privacy Law, 31
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 447, 450 (2010) (explaining the sources of privacy law in the United States).
148 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 39 (2000) (“The common law of torts is almost
exclusively state law.”).
149 As the focus of this work is on the Federal Wiretap Act, a full dive into the other federal
privacy laws passed by Congress will not be conducted. However, for more information on these laws,
see Andy Green, Complete Guide to Privacy Laws in the US, VARONIS, https://www.varonis.com/blog/usprivacy-laws [https://perma.cc/U9NW-NHPZ] (“The US . . . has vertically focused data federal
privacy laws for ﬁnance . . . healthcare . . . [and] children’s data . . . .”). There is no comprehensive
federal privacy law as of yet. Both the Republican and Democratic parties have introduced their
versions of data privacy laws. See generally Consumer Data Privacy and Security Act of 2020, S.
3456, 116th Cong. (2020) (outlining the bill introduced by Senator Moran regarding consumer data
privacy); Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2968, 116th Cong. (2019) (laying out provisions
introduced by Senator Cantewell concerning consumer privacy rights).
150 See discussion supra subsection I.A.2.
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Katz v. United States151 and Kyllo v. United States,152 the Court solidiﬁed the
doctrine of constitutional privacy rights in Griswold v Connecticut.153 Griswold
was one of the earliest Supreme Court decisions to engage in a discussion of
marital privacy. In its holding, the Court discussed the “zones of privacy”
created by the First Amendment’s right of association, the Third
Amendment’s “prohibition against the quartering of soldiers” during times of
peace, the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unlawful search and
seizures, the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, and the Ninth
Amendment’s statement emphasizing that the Constitution’s enumerated
rights “shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.”154 Taken together, the penumbra of these rights provided the basis
for a right to marital contraception: in Griswold, the Court struck down a
Connecticut law that banned married couples from using contraceptives
within their own home.155 Griswold, decided in 1965 before the advent of modern
constitutional sex equality law, emphasizes the sanctity of the marital union and
treats spouses as being of one whole, echoing elements of coverture.156
The decision fortifying an individual right to privacy, on the other hand,
came in 1972, when the Court expanded the right to obtain contraceptive
devices to unmarried persons with its holding in Eisenstadt v. Baird.157 Through
this holding, the Court expanded the individual right to privacy articulated in
the earlier spatial privacy cases and applied it to the context of intimate
relationships.158 Eisenstadt recognized parity between a married couple’s right
to privacy and that of an unmarried individual.159 Justice Brennan declared:
[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a
separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
151 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (acknowledging the right “to know that he will remain free from
unreasonable searches and seizures”).
152 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (reinforcing the notion of a Fourth Amendment right to privacy
within the home from both physical and technological intrusion).
153 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (“The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within
the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”).
154 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IX).
155 Id. at 485.
156 See id. at 480-81 (discussing the third-party standing on behalf of the “married people” at
issue and the fact that the advice was given to “married persons”).
157 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
158 See id. at 439 (“If under Griswold, the distribution of contraceptives to married persons
cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible,
since the constitutionally protected right of privacy inheres in the individual, not the married
couple.”) (citation omitted).
159 See id. at 450 (noting that the need for prescribed contraceptives is as great for unmarried
people as it is for married people).
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be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally aﬀecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.160
From this point onward, personal rights to privacy clearly did not wholly
depend on marriage.
In light of these cases, we see that the Court ﬁrst solidiﬁed the right to
privacy in marriage as a reﬂection of marital unity, then backtracked and
emphasized that individuals retain their personal privacy even when married.
Though these concurrent cases were seemingly unrelated at the time, taken
together we see that the spousal wiretap cases and the individual privacy cases
are wholly inconsistent with each other. Therefore, the spousal wiretap
exception is further dispelled.
2. Tort
The demise of interspousal tort immunity similarly signaled the downfall
of the marital unity doctrine, allowing wives to sue their husbands over
breaches of personal autonomy. In his analysis of privacy torts, William
Prosser oﬀered four distinct categories of tort privacy law: intrusion upon
one’s seclusion, disclosure of one’s private facts publicly, placement of a
person “in a false light in the public eye,” and appropriation of one’s “name
or likeness.”161 Most pertinent to our discussion is intrusion upon one’s
seclusion, codiﬁed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts as enforcing a right
of action against “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise,
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private aﬀairs or concerns,
[making him] subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
intrusion would be highly oﬀensive to a reasonable person.”162
The phrases “physically or otherwise” and “private aﬀairs or concerns”
directly tie spousal wiretapping to notions of personal autonomy and
individual privacy. Indeed, phone wiretapping was the only available option
at the time of the Wiretap Act’s enactment, but electronic methods of
wiretapping are now available.163 Additionally, these contemporary methods
are used to obtain information regarding the “private aﬀairs or concerns” of
one of the spouses in the marital relationship.164
The “reasonable” requirement is also of note. When spouses share a
computer, phone, or any type of community property used for communication,
Id. at 453.
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(B) (AM. L. INST. 1977).
See discussion infra Section III.B. (explaining new methods for wiretapping such as
computer surveillance software and phone spyware).
164 Id.
160
161
162
163

1118

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 170:1093

taking offense to a spouse’s surveillance may very well be unreasonable.165
However, most individuals do not understand the capabilities of electronic
surveillance devices or software, and they likely would not use the shared device
if they knew their spouse could be spying on their secret communications,
implying that reasonable offense to the conduct could still be taken.166 As a
result, finding a spousal exception to the Wiretap Act in the penumbra of
“unified” marital privacy would be in disagreement with the accepted fact that
individuals have autonomy over their communications in tort.167
Unlike those under historic coverture laws,168 personal notions of
individual privacy are not as easily signed away with the vow of “I do.”169
Although it is true that a couple forgoes certain levels of seclusion when they
move in together, this does not mean that they also forego their personal right
to be free from prying eyes.170 This balancing act is a breeding ground for
confusion surrounding whether an individual truly expects their
communications to be free from interception by their spouse. It is true that a
partner who operates under a “none of your business” attitude will create
signiﬁcant problems in a relationship, but the other end of the spectrum
would require individuals entering into marriage to recognize that they no
longer have a life outside of their spouse and no room for privacy—a
sentiment echoing coverture.171
Of course, an individual cannot fully expect to maintain abundant levels
of privacy away from their spouse and keep a healthy relationship. However,
I argue that it would be reasonable to take oﬀense to discovering that one’s
spouse has secretly intercepted their communications located on a personal
165 See Sally Brown Richardson, Privacy and Community Property, 95 N.C. L. REV. 729, 733
(2017) (“Spouses may lose at least some, and perhaps all, of their rights of privacy with regard to
community property.”).
166 See Camille Calman, Note, Spy vs. Spouse: Regulating Surveillance Software on Shared Marital
Computers, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2111 (2005) (“Ordinary users, however, are probably unaware
of the extent to which their computers store activity . . . . [N]o reasonable person would ever use a
shared computer to conduct secret activities if he or she was aware such secrets were detectable.”).
167 See Laura W. Morgan & Lewis B. Reich, The Individual’s Right of Privacy in a Marriage, 23
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAWS. 111, 125 (2010) (noting that marriage does not eliminate one’s
constitutional right to “personal autonomy”).
168 See discussion supra subsection II.A.1.
169 See Morgan & Reich, supra note 167, at 128 (“Despite the lack of clearly articulable standards
as to what constitutes invasion of privacy, human beings innately crave an inner core of privacy that
cannot be breached by society.”) (citations omitted); see also Calman, supra note 166, at 2114 (“Entry
into marriage does not entail signing away the right to communicate privately with persons outside
the marital relationship.”).
170 See Morgan & Reich, supra note 167, at 125 (describing the balance between “personal
autonomy” and the lack of seclusion in marriage).
171 See id. at 128 (“At the same time, marriage or marriage-type relationships demand
‘transparency.’ One needn’t be a psychologist to know that a spouse who says, “That’s none of your
business” to the other spouse is in deep trouble.”) (citations omitted).
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cell phone or computer. Perhaps under coverture one could argue that, once
a spouse enters into a marriage, they lose any right to privacy from their
spouse, but contemporary tort law, it seems, does not permit such a notion.172
In sum, there today exists a constitutionally protected individual privacy
right rooted in personal autonomy. And today there is a cause of action in
tort for invasions of privacy. Taken together, these principles demand that
spouses retain individual zones of privacy within the marital relationship that,
when infringed upon, can be remedied in a court of law. Therefore, a spouse
wiretapping their partner’s personal communications is engaging in an illegal
and oﬀensive act, regardless of the fact that they are the tappee’s spouse.
III. CONTEMPORARY CONSIDERATIONS
The above survey of the evolution of constitutional and common law
relating to areas of gender-based discrimination, marriage, and privacy
reveals the crumbled foundations of the spousal wiretap exception.
Contemporary social and technological developments also illustrate the
diﬃculties in sustaining a spousal wiretap exception in the twenty-ﬁrst
century. While sex-based stereotypes are hardly absent from contemporary
marital practices, marriage is now understood as a voluntary union of equal
individuals who may choose whether to adhere to conventional gender roles.
Additionally, wiretapping is no longer limited to putting a bug on the family
telephone. Now, information can be captured in real-time through invasive
technologies downloaded onto personal devices such as laptops and
cellphones.173 With these modern considerations in mind, the argument for
maintaining a spousal exception to the Wiretap Act is signiﬁcantly weakened.
A. Social Marriage Developments
A brief portrait of the social landscape of contemporary marriage is
necessary to begin the discussion of why a spousal exception to the Wiretap
Act cannot lie with its foundations in coverture. It is important to note that
historic notions of marriage have not been completely wiped oﬀ the books.
Indeed, individuals still engage in power struggles in the quest for fulﬁllment
in their marital life just as they did in the early years of the nation.174
However, spouses now have the ability to continuously contract within the
relationship to create an arrangement that beneﬁts them equally, instead of
See supra notes 162–167 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Section III.B.
STEVEN MINTZ, THE PRIME OF LIFE: A HISTORY OF MODERN ADULTHOOD 97 (2015)
(“Our understanding of marriage has changed dramatically in recent years, but the struggles for
conjugal power, individuality, and fulﬁllment within marriage have remained constant.”).
172
173
174
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blindly adhering to paternalistic social structures.175 The notion that spouses
are a single entity perhaps may exist in romantic theory, but in the practical
day to day, “spouses maintain their separate identity even after marriage.”176
With equal bargaining power and the retention of individuality within the
marital relationship, a doctrine based in women’s subordination is not only
constitutionally suspect but socially unsustainable. A spousal wiretap
exception ignores how spouses today maintain their own individual lives,
which require private communications that their marital partner is not
entitled to see. Additionally, it is no longer necessary for spouses, especially
wives, to depend fully on their partners for ﬁnancial stability.177 Thus, they
are no longer required to give up the bargaining chips that they maintain as
single individuals. Their property can be shared if they so choose, but it does
not need to be shared for a secure marital relationship.
B. Developments in the Digital Age
Dramatic technological changes vastly expand the scope and nature of
intrusions on personal privacy.178 There is a newfound danger in allowing for
a spousal wiretap exception that would permit spouses to intercept more than
conversations over the phone.179 The aforementioned Luis case provides one
example of electronic surveillance being used for spousal spying,180 but the
electronic surveillance industry remains largely untouched by the courts in

175 Id. at 100 (“[F]ar-reaching transformations [have] radically reshaped marriage over the past
four centuries. One involves the shift of marriage from a status and a social institution, with clearly
deﬁned roles, to a contractual relationship worked out by the partners.”).
176 Id. at 105.
177 See, e.g., Sarah Jane Glynn, Breadwinning Mothers Continue to Be the U.S. Norm, CAP
(May 10, 2019), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/breadwinning-mothers-continue-u-snorm [https://perma.cc/9XJ9-CFTD] (“Fathers have always been very likely to work for pay, but
mothers have dramatically increased their participation in paid labor over the past 40 years. In 1976,
only 56.3 percent of married mothers worked for pay, compared with 69.6 percent in 2017.”).
178 See Calman, supra note 166, at 2098 (discussing how the introduction of computers and
spyware changed the electronic surveillance landscape).
179 See id. at 2121 (“The unsettled nature of the law regarding e-mail and computer privacy
opens a gap in privacy protection that is exploited by the makers and users of surveillance software.
Because the pace of the law is generally slow while the pace of technological innovation is rapid,
marital use of surveillance software remains legal . . . .”).
180 See Luis v. Zang, 833 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir. 2016) (“The program allegedly ‘records all PC
activity including emails, IMs, websites visited, web searches, Facebook/MySpace activity, and
anything typed in real time.’”).
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the spousal wiretap context.181 In fact, spyware providers are enjoying
booming business.182
Two prevalent types of modern electronic surveillance devices are
surveillance software and spyware.183 Surveillance software is manually
downloaded by the spouse conducting the surveillance onto a device, whereas
spyware is usually unintentionally and unknowingly downloaded by the
individual being spied on.184 Surveillance software works by “record[ing] a
computer user’s activity, either key-stroke by keystroke or by periodically
saving ‘screenshots’ . . . or both.”185 Certain surveillance software can be
installed and hidden, running secretly in the background and making it prime
for use by curious spouses interested in computer activity.186
Spyware, on the other hand, poses even greater real-time risks. Spyware
apps such as mSpy and The Spy Bubble (advertised as phone apps parents may
use to monitor children), are “jack-of-all-spying-trades” apps downloaded onto
smartphones that can track who a person calls, what their text messages say,
their location, and the apps downloaded onto their phone.187 Smartphones,
however, often hold much more information than that. Indeed, spyware apps,
which already access text messages, can also access “medical appointments,
online banking activity, [and] intellectual musings . . . .”188 Unless an individual
has opted to share this personal information with their partner, there seems to
be little concrete justification for such an invasion of privacy into the innerworkings of one’s day-to-day simply because one holds the title of “spouse.”
The ultimate challenge courts will likely face is how to nail these
surveillance methods down as “wiretap devices,” focusing primarily on the
real-time transmission element of the Wiretap Act.189 As seen in Luis, where
the main question was not whether the defendant had a spousal defense but
whether the communications were intercepted by the surveillance software
in real-time, the court found it “signiﬁcant” to the holding that the
181 See Danielle Keats Citron, Spying Inc., 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1243, 1266 (2015) (“Despite
the increasing prevalence of spyware, federal prosecutors have only brought a handful of cases.”).
182 Id. at 1250 (noting that while the Federal Trade Commission and some state Attorneys
General have sought action against spyware providers, “[their] services continue to proliferate [and]
their ads brazenly appear online”).
183 See Calman, supra note 166, at 2098 (distinguishing surveillance software from spyware).
184 Id.
185 Id. at 2099-100.
186 Id. at 2101 (“Both Spector and eBlaster [forms of spyware] can be installed in ‘stealth mode,’
so that the programs will not appear on the Windows desktop or any Windows menus.”).
187 See Ann Brenoﬀ, 5 Apps to Spy on Your Kids Without Them Knowing, HUFFINGTON POST
(July 29, 2015, 7:59 AM), https://www.huﬀpost.com/entry/how-to-track-your-kids-without-themknowing-youre-on-their-tail_n_55afaﬀ1e4b07af29d56f544 [https://perma.cc/D4KM-7BVW].
188 Citron, supra note 181, at 1247.
189 See id. at 1264 (discussing how surveillance software and spyware ﬁt into the elements of
what constitutes a wiretap device under § 2512 of the Wiretap Act).
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surveillance software had obtained the communications while they were in
the course of transmission.190 If a device does not capture real-time
transmissions, it does not constitute wiretapping, and the action would likely
fall under the Stored Communications Act,191 which does not have a similar
spousal exception, instead of the Wiretap Act.
As individuals continue to grow more tech-savvy and providers sell
spyware and surveillance software meant only for spying in real-time, it
might be necessary for legislatures to regulate their use speciﬁcally. In any
event, allowing for a spousal exception in a digital age wherein spouses can
access deeply personal communications beyond simple phone conversations
would neglect the changing technological landscape in favor of outdated
principles of marital unity.
IV. ELIMINATING THE EXCEPTION FOR GOOD: STATE WIRETAP ACT
CODIFICATION
Eliminating the spousal wiretap exception in all jurisdictions is necessary
to mitigate the risk of intimate deceit. Maintaining individual privacy in the
relationship is characteristic of modern marriage,192 and without passing
judgment on what may make a husband begin to spy on his unwitting wife,
wiretapping her communications is an invasion of privacy. Not only does
sanctioning the exception run the risk of allowing potentially damning
information to be used in subsequent family law proceedings,193 but spousal
deception through spying may also result in emotional distress, expensive
litigation costs, and harm to parties outside the relationship.194
Since the spousal exception is judicially promulgated common law, the
simplest route to abolition is for the Second and Fifth Circuits to overrule
190 Luis v. Zang, 833 F.3d 619, 631 (6th Cir. 2016) (“This near real-time monitoring is
signiﬁcant. If a [software] user can, in fact, review another person’s communications in near realtime, then [the software] must be acquiring the communications and transferring them to [the
software provider’s] servers as soon as the communications are sent.”).
191 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (penalizing conduct that results in accessing or exceeding authorized
access to stored communications). Notably, the Stored Communications Act has been found not to
reach communications (such as emails) already opened by the intended recipient. See, e.g., Santori
v. Schrodt, 424 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1134 (N.D. Fla. 2019) (“[T]he [Stored Communications Act] doesn’t
reach and protect undeleted emails that have already been delivered and opened by the intended
recipient. In that situation . . . the emails are no longer ‘in electronic storage.’”).
192 See Stephanie Fairyington, Do You Have a Right to Privacy in Your Marriage, TIME (Aug. 8,
2016, 10:58 AM), https://time.com/4419321/privacy-in-marriage [https://perma.cc/J5RJ-XQT2]
(“Despite the frightening and ever-expanding ways to electronically snoop, in order to fully
modernize marriage we need to resist the degrading urge to spy on our spouses and acknowledge,
in radical opposition to our times, each individual’s right to privacy within matrimony.”).
193 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
194 See JILL ELAINE HASDAY, INTIMATE LIES AND THE LAW 78-95 (2019) (using first-person
accounts, lawsuits, and social science research to describe the harms engendered by intimate deception).
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the cases that support it. Without cases challenging the rulings in front of
these Circuit Courts (sitting en banc), however, this is unlikely to occur.195 Of
course, it is possible that the existing circuit split on the issue may make a
spousal wiretap case slightly more attractive for Supreme Court review, but
this is also unlikely due to the small number of cases that the Court hears
each year and the Court’s recent willingness to leave many circuit splits
unresolved.196 Therefore, the cases will likely need to be legislatively
overruled through Congressional action that amends the Federal Wiretap Act
to explicitly deny the availability of a spousal exception.197 For Congress to
legislate on the issue, however, there would likely need to be a growing
national concern surrounding spousal wiretapping,198 much like the sentiment
that existed at the time of the Wiretap Act’s enactment. While this avenue to
eliminating the spousal wiretap exception cannot be ruled out, the number of
bills eventually enacted into law is extremely low,199 diminishing hope for
legislative action in this niche area.
A more practical option is to attack the spousal exception on the state
level. I argue that state legislatures must eliminate any spousal exception to
the Wiretap Act. It is settled that states are well equipped to handle divorce
proceedings and regulations,200 so a possible solution to the issue of spousal
wiretapping is clear state legislation on the issue. States can achieve the
intended result of eliminating the spousal wiretap exception by taking the
initiative to explicitly ban interspousal wiretapping on the state level. By
conﬁrming that spouses are not exempt under the Act, the state is exercising
its distinct power in the realm of domestic relations while respecting the
baseline protections of the federal Wiretap Act. This decision would, at the
very least, practically nullify the federal common law wiretap exception
195 Circuit courts sitting en banc may decline to follow established precedent of the court and
use it only as persuasive authority. Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United
States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787, 798 (2012) (“Sitting en banc, circuit judges are not bound by prior panel
decisions, but may give some deference to well-entrenched precedent.”).
196 Historically, a circuit split on an issue was an indicator that the Supreme Court should take
up a case to provide uniformity in the application of federal law going forward. However, with the
declining number of cases that the Supreme Court hears each year, a growing number of circuit
splits will remain unresolved. For a discussion on circuit split resolution considering the Supreme
Court’s shrinking docket, see generally Wyatt G. Sassman, How Circuits Can Fix Their Splits, 103
MARQUETTE L. REV. 1401, 1403 (2020).
197 Cf. NEAL DEVINS, ENCYC. SUP. CT. U.S., CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES TO JUDICIAL
DECISIONS (Mark Graber et al. eds., 2008) (noting that Congress is permitted to “negate a Supreme
Court interpretation by enacting new legislation”).
198 Members of Congress are likely to introduce legislation on salient issues in the United
States. See Jeﬀrey Lazarus, Issue Salience and Bill Introduction in the House and Senate, 40 CONG. &
PRESIDENCY 215, 226-27 (2013) (“Members of both the House and Senate disproportionately
sponsor bills in issue areas that their constituents ﬁnd salient.”).
199 Id. at 215 (noting that slightly under 4% of introduced bills become law in most Congresses).
200 See discussion supra subsection II.A.3.
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because state law would serve to deter the wiretapping in the ﬁrst place. At
most, state legislation on the issue would give rise to an occasion for the Fifth
and Second Circuits to address the spousal wiretap exception if a case
asserting it as a defense comes before those courts.
In her note on spousal surveillance, Camille Calman suggests that the
diﬀering perspectives of the states on privacy rights would allow “legislatures
choosing to address the issue of marital computer privacy . . . [to] create a
wide range of state statutes . . . .”201 This process, in turn, gives the states a
chance to “establish which solutions will best protect privacy without chilling
legitimate uses of technology.”202 I recognize that having various state statutes
on speciﬁc surveillance technology would provide the beneﬁt of trial and
error in legislating against providers of surveillance devices. However, I
believe that a uniform adoption among the states of legislation explicitly
dispelling the existence of a spousal wiretap exception would serve to deter
spying spouses themselves—the key actors in these cases. When listing the
codiﬁed exceptions to the wiretap law, legislators can tack on a disclaimer
stating: “Individuals engaged in intimate domestic relationships, such as
couples, domestic partners, and spouses, are not exempt from liability under
this Act.” These few words can serve to undo years of sexist and invasive legal
doctrine on the subject of spousal wiretapping.
State legislation speciﬁcally disclaiming a spousal exception to
wiretapping is permissible because states have the ability to promulgate
wiretap laws that are stricter than the federal Wiretap Act.203 The federal
government would still retain the right to hear spousal wiretap cases should
they arise, because most violations of state wiretap law implicate the federal
Wiretap Act as well (due to the modeling of state statutes after the Act).204
However, spouses would likely be deterred from engaging in wiretapping in
anticipation of divorce proceedings when the legal prohibition against the
conduct is abundantly clear. As a result, the deterrent eﬀect will pass through
to the federal level and the notion of a potential spousal exception to the
Wiretap Act would likely fade from federal jurisprudence.

Calman, supra note 166, at 2129.
Id. at 2129.
See Shana K. Rahavy, The Federal Wiretap Act: The Permissible Scope of Eavesdropping in the
Family Home, 2 J. HIGH. TECH. L. 87, 89 (2003) (“To avoid preemption, states may adopt more
stringent standards than required under Federal law, but not less restrictive.”).
204 See generally Erin M. Pauley, Conflicts Among Federal and State Wiretap Statutes Present
Practical Challenges for Businesses, 8 NAT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2018) (“Forty-nine states (all except for
Vermont) have enacted statutes and regulations modeled after the Federal Wiretap Act . . . .”).
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V. CONCLUSION
The federal Wiretap Act, on its face, leaves virtually no room for a spousal
exception. However, the spousal exception, a sexist and obsolete doctrine,
stands as good law in some jurisdictions. These courts have attempted to use
the domestic relations doctrine and silences in the legislative history of the
Wiretap Act to determine that an implied spousal immunity exists.
The federal common law spousal wiretap exception was promulgated
during a time of ﬂux in the areas of marital, gender, and privacy law. Coming
oﬀ the heels of coverture, certain jurisdictions’ movements away from the
promulgation of patriarchal structures and marital unity could not sway legal
thinkers everywhere when, for some, those notions were all they had known
up until that point in time. However, in retrospect, the jurisprudence
surrounding the dismantling of coverture and focus on marital individualism,
gender equality, and personal autonomy makes it impossible for the spousal
exception to continue as a permissible doctrine. And yet, it sits untouched in
the Circuits that held the exception as permissible nearly 50 years ago.
Eliminating the spousal exception will likely not be achieved through the
federal judicial process or through Congress. Although the aim is to eliminate
the potential exception to the federal Wiretap Act, states are in the best
position to legislate against spousal wiretapping. By explicitly prohibiting
spousal wiretapping on the state level, state legislation would deter spouses
from engaging in wiretapping altogether.
Even if a savvy spouse in the Fifth or Second Circuit argues that
longstanding precedent allows for spying on a partner’s real-time
communications, the case would not only bring the exception’s viability to
light but also give these courts another pass at an issue that would likely be
decided diﬀerently today considering modern social and technological
developments. Overall, marriage is meant to be a romantic and emotional
union,205 but it can no longer be viewed as a legal union that serves to
eliminate the individual property or privacy rights of one spouse. If the
spousal wiretap exception continues to go untouched, it would allow for
snooping spouses, in the name of a doctrine based in widely dispelled
patriarchal structures, to diminish the sanctity of marital trust going forward.

205 See generally STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: HOW LOVE CONQUERED
MARRIAGE (2005) (describing the evolution of the concept of marrying for love).

